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This chapter presents a model of training center behavior in an en-
vironment that includes a generic performance management system for 
active labor market programs (ALMPs), such as those funded under 
JTPA and WIA in the United States. The model builds on the work of 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) and provides more intuition and 
discussion of the model and its implications, along with some useful 
extensions.1 Additionally, our model offers an essential conceptual con-
text for the detailed analyses of the JTPA and WIA programs that follow 
in the remaining chapters of this volume.
The model we develop assumes that training (or workforce de-
velopment) centers seek to maximize the present discounted value of 
earnings (or employment) impacts from the services they provide, as 
well as, potentially, goals related to the characteristics of participants 
and to the effort levels exerted by program staff.2 The JTPA and WIA 
programs both have formally stated equity (service to particular sub-
groups) and effi ciency (improving labor market outcomes relative to 
what would have occurred without the program) goals. Our model dem-
onstrates how these objectives interact with a performance standards 
system based on short-term outcome measures, and we discuss in de-
tail why all of the performance standards systems we know of rely on 
performance measures based on outcome levels measured in the short 
term rather than on impacts (“value added”) over the long run. The use 
of short-term outcomes as performance measures has the potential to 
misdirect activity by focusing training center attention on criteria only 
loosely (or even perversely) related to long-run net benefi ts, long-run 
equity criteria, or both. For example, if program activities encourage 
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further training and schooling, they may reduce employment and earn-
ings in the short run but raise them in the long run.
Most discussions of performance standards focus on cream skim-
ming, sometimes defi ned as selecting persons into a program who 
would have done well without it. Anderson et al. (1992) and Barnow 
(1992) represent early examples of this literature, while Courty, Kim, 
and Marschke (forthcoming) provide an important recent contribution. 
In the context of a system of performance standards, cream skimming 
occurs when training centers serve individuals who will increase their 
measured performance rather than basing service provision decisions 
on individuals’ expected long-run benefi ts from participation. In this 
chapter, we provide a concise formal defi nition of cream skimming in 
terms of our model notation, show how performance standards based 
on participant outcomes in the short run encourage it, and discuss the 
conditions under which it does or does not lead centers away from the 
goal of maximizing discounted impacts.
The model we introduce allows responses to performance stan-
dards in terms of who gets selected into the program from among the 
eligible population and how program resources get allocated among 
participants, as well as strategic responses that seek to increase mea-
sured performance conditional on actual performance, such as those 
considered in Chapter 7. More generally, this model provides a clear 
conceptual framework within which to think about when (and if) per-
formance standards systems in ALMPs will increase the labor market 
impacts they produce, and when (and if) they will have unintended 
consequences due to responses by program staff to the sometimes mis-
guided incentives they provide.  
A MODEL OF TRAINING CENTER CHOICES
Training centers face three choices in each period: 1) how many 
people to train, 2) which particular people to train, and 3) how many 
resources to devote to each trainee. In the current WIA program, ac-
cess to “core” workforce development services (such as labor market 
information and job search assistance) is universal, but access to more 
intensive levels of service (such as comprehensive assessment and case 
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management, vocational training, and subsidized on-the-job training) 
still involves some degree of selection by caseworkers in light of the 
available training resources for individual clients and services (see So-
cial Policy Research Associates [2004] for more institutional details on 
WIA). Thus, in the WIA context, our model applies to these more inten-
sive services. Adding a requirement that all eligible individuals receive 
some very small level of service would not change any of the basic 
results from the model.
For simplicity, we assume that training centers face a completely 
new cohort of potential trainees in each period; this avoids potential 
complications associated with training centers making choices about 
when to serve particular people. More generally, we assume that train-
ing centers operate in a “stationary” environment, which means that 
the center’s decision rules do not change over time. Put differently, if 
a center faces the same set of potential trainees, the same technology 
for producing trainee outcomes, and the same budget constraint in two 
different periods, it will make exactly the same choices in those two 
periods. We assume that the set of potential trainees and the technology 
stay the same, and, in later sections, that the budget varies only as a 
result of performance awards.
We ignore the individual application decision in our model and sim-
ply assume that the training center can choose to serve any or all of the 
eligible individuals in each cohort (given its budget constraint). In so 
doing, we abstract from center choices regarding marketing, outreach, 
contractor selection, and other factors that might affect who applies to 
the program, even though the presence or details of a performance stan-
dards system might affect these choices.
We also assume that individuals participate or not in the fi rst pe-
riod of their adult lives, which we denote age zero, and that training 
takes exactly one period for all trainees. Thus, we implicitly ignore 
individual choices regarding the timing of training.3 Each individual 
has two potential outcomes at each age: a benchmark (or untreated) 
outcome that arises if the individual does not participate (at age zero), 
and a treated outcome that arises if the individual does participate (at 
age zero). In terms of the usual notation, we denote the participant out-
comes by 1, 0, ,aY a A  , where A is the fi nal period of the person’s 
life, and denote the nonparticipant outcomes by 0 , 0, ,aY a A  . The 
per-period treatment effect equals 1 0a a aY Y   . The treatment effect 
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can be negative in the short run if, for example, program participation 
leads to additional schooling or distracts the individual from useful job 
search.4 We abstract from potential general equilibrium effects in our 
discussion.5 In the language of the treatment effects literature, we make 
the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which means that 
the treated and untreated outcomes just defi ned do not depend on who 
participates or on how many individuals participate.
To allow our analysis to fi t into a standard cost-benefi t framework, 
let Y denote earnings; we can easily generalize the model to include 
employment or education outcomes. The net (of costs) present value of 
the program impacts (hereinafter just “net impacts”) measured at time 












where ic  denotes the costs associated with participant i. We assume that 
( , )a c  varies among individuals but the interest rate r does not.6
The model assumes that training centers can apply different amounts 
of input, e, to each participant. In the context of JTPA or WIA (or simi-
lar programs), the input variable represents the value of staff time and 
the direct costs of the services provided. The inputs affect the outcomes 
experienced by participants. In particular, input e yields 
(3.2)  1 0( , )a aY f Y e ,
at cost c(e), where c(0) = 0. The total cost for participant i is given by 
( )i i ic c e k  , where k denotes a per-participant fi xed cost. Note that 
we allow both the amount of the inputs and the marginal cost of the 
inputs to vary among participants.
By choosing to model a continuous input e, we abstract from reality 
on two important dimensions. First, most of the services provided by 
ALMPs come in discrete chunks of a particular type. For example, JTPA 
offered, and WIA currently offers, classroom training in occupational 
skills, job search assistance, and subsidized on-the-job training at pri-
vate fi rms, among other services. Classroom training consists of various 
types of courses, each aimed at a particular occupation and each having 
a specifi c duration. The other service types vary in a similar way. Rep-
resenting this complex mix of discrete services by a continuous input 
chapter3.indd   32 4/27/2011   9:41:34 AM
A Formal Model of a Performance Incentive System   33
simplifi es our model considerably, but at the cost of abstracting from 
the potential impact of performance standards not only on the amount of 
services provided but on their type and duration. For example, Heinrich 
(1999), Barnow and Gubits (2002), and D’Amico and Salzman (2004) 
(and many others) have argued that a focus on short-term outcomes 
in performance standards pushes training centers toward providing 
shorter, less-intensive services such as job search assistance to a larger 
number of trainees. Second, we ignore the fact that inputs often get al-
located to participants dynamically in response to their experiences in 
particular treatments and in response to their labor market outcomes. 
For example, at the end of a classroom training course, participants with 
a job lined up do not receive job search assistance, while those without 
a job lined up often do. Our simplifying assumption means that our 
model also fails to capture any effects of performance standards on this 
dynamic service allocation process.
Given these assumptions, training centers have several degrees of 
freedom in regard to whom to serve and how many inputs to devote 
to each participant. First, for a fi xed set of inputs, a training center 
can choose to serve individuals with different ( , )a c combinations. 
Second, holding the set of participants fi xed, the training center can 
choose the inputs it provides to each participant, which has the effect of 
changing their potential outcomes given participation (and, necessarily, 
changing their impacts of participation as well). Third, a training center 
can choose the number of participants by trading off between the fi xed 
cost k and the variable input cost ( )i ic e .
If the training center maximizes the ex post present value of the 
net earnings impacts realized by its trainees, it solves a constrained op-
timization problem. Maximizing the present value of the net impacts 
corresponds to a social goal of effi ciency in the economic sense; it means 
making the economic “pie” as large as possible while ignoring equity 
concerns other than those implicit in the program’s eligibility rules. In 
the absence of a budget constraint, the center would simply fi nd the e 

















In the real world, and in our model, training centers operate under a 
budget constraint. Let B denote the center budget in each period. With a 
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budget constraint, centers face a trade-off between serving more clients 
and devoting more inputs to each client. Let{1,..., }I be the index set 
of eligible individuals; put differently, label each eligible person with 
a number from 1 to I. Person i has associated variable costs ci(ei) and 
fi xed cost k. We assume that technology (3.2) is common across persons 
although this assumption can easily be relaxed. 
The training center solves its maximization problem in two steps. 
In the fi rst step, for each possible set of trainees {1,..., }S I  in the cur-
rent cohort it determines the optimal choice of inputs to devote to each 
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subject to Equation (3.2), and
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For LaGrange multiplier λ attached to the constraint in (3.5), solv-
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for each observation i S . Condition (3.6) represents the standard ef-
fi ciency condition for ie  which sets marginal benefi t equal to marginal 
cost. In the absence of a budget constraint, λ = 1 at an interior optimum. 
In general, λ ≥ 1, refl ecting the scarcity of the resources available to the 
center, and the center invests less in each person than it would in the 
absence of resource constraints.7
The second step to solving the overall optimization problem for 
each cohort consists of comparing the optimal value of the present value 
of net impacts for each subset S and choosing the subset *S that has the 
highest one. Formally, write the maximized present value implied by 
the solution to the constrained optimization problem in Equation (3.4) 
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as ψ(S,B), where this notation shows the dependence of the optimum on 
both the set S of participants selected and the available budget B. The 
center chooses the optimal S, which we denote by S*, so that
ψ(S*,B) = arg max ψ (S,B).8 
 
 
               S
Implementing this ex post optimal solution requires information 
that both the centers and (to a lesser extent) the individuals themselves 
do not possess at the time of participation. In particular, they do not 
know future values of 1 0( , )a aY Y , although they may have other infor-
mation useful for predicting these values. For example, most ALMPs 
collect information on observable characteristics associated with out-
comes from prospective participants, and some may also have access to 
administrative data on past labor market outcomes. 
The available evidence suggests the diffi culty of forecasting future 
a. In particular, Bell and Orr (2002) show that caseworkers do a very 
poor job of predicting a in a program that provides job training to 
welfare recipients, and Lechner and Smith (2007) show that Swiss case-
workers also do not perform well at this task. Carneiro, Hansen, and 
Heckman (2003) demonstrate that individuals cannot forecast most of 
the variation in the earnings impact associated with attending college.
Let iJ  denote the center’s information set for individual i. Taking 
into account the lack of complete information, the criterion for ex ante 
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c e k
r 
       
    
  ,
subject to Equation (3.2), Equation (3.5), and the individual-specifi c 
information sets i i SJ  . For each S, i i SJ  , B, and r, we may write the 
solution to this present value maximization problem as  , ,S B J , 
where 1 I{ ,..., }J J J . The training center seeks to maximize this crite-
rion with respect to S, so that
   *, , arg max , ,
S
S B J S B J  .
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In this model, training centers adjust at three margins: 1) which eli-
gible individuals become trainees (in WIA, which participants receive 
intense services), 2) the amount of inputs devoted to each trainee, and 
3) the number of trainees. While the exact trade-offs depend on the 
specifi cations of the technology for producing outcomes in Equation 
(3.2), the marginal cost functions, and the level of fi xed costs k, a set 
of intuitive comparative static results follow directly from the model. 
For example, increasing the slope of the marginal cost function c(e), 
all else equal, leads centers to increase the number of participants and 
to serve each one less intensively. Increases in the fi xed cost k have the 
opposite effect, reducing the number of participants and increasing the 
amount of resources devoted to each one. Individuals with higher mar-
ginal costs—i.e., larger values of ( )i ic e —will, all else equal, receive 
fewer inputs. Increasing the amount of complementarity between the 
untreated outcome and the costs in the production function in Equation 
(3.2) leads centers to devote relatively more inputs to participants with 
good untreated outcomes. Increases in the budget lead, in general, to 
both more participants and more inputs per participant. Finally, in a 
stationary environment, the training center makes the same decision in 
every period.9
MOTIVATING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
The model in the preceding section assumes that training centers 
maximize the net present value of impacts and nothing else. In fact, 
training centers exist in a political context and they employ caseworkers 
and managers who care about outcomes other than just the maximiza-
tion of the present value of net impacts. Consider the politicians fi rst. 
Politicians care about what training centers do. In particular, they care 
not only about present value maximization but also about other aspects 
of who, and how many, get served. For example, politicians may care 
about the absolute number of participants, based on the view that each 
participant will feel that he or she has received something from the 
politician, and so, perhaps, will vote accordingly. Politicians may also 
care about serving members of particular groups whose leaders support 
them or about serving highly visible individuals, such as those who lose 
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their jobs when a major plant closes; see, e.g., Heinrich (1999) on the 
role of politics in JTPA contract award decisions. 
We can summarize politicians’ preferences by the utility function  UP[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S)], where ψ(S) denotes the expected present value 
of net impacts for participant cohort S (with the other arguments sup-
pressed for simplicity), and N(S) denotes the number of participants 
(≤ I ) served in cohort S. Q(S) denotes other qualities of the persons 
served such as demographic characteristics or their untreated outcomes, 
with the latter motivated by a desire to serve those least well off in the 
absence of the program due to equity concerns. 
 Training center staff members also care about aspects of their work 
other than just present value maximization. For example, as discussed 
in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996), caseworkers may prefer to serve 
the most disadvantaged (those with the lowest benchmark outcomes 0aY )
or members of particular subgroups among the eligible. At the same 
time, they may prefer to serve fewer individuals than present value 
maximization would imply if, for example, they get utility from getting 
to know their clients in depth. Abstracting for simplicity from the fact 
that training center managers (some of them future politicians) may 
have different preferences than the line workers they manage, we can 
summarize the training center utility function by UT[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S)].
Given either utility function, we can defi ne a constrained optimi-
zation problem similar to that defi ned in the preceding section. The 
problem consists of maximizing the utility function subject to the tech-
nology for producing participant outcomes in Equation (3.2) and the 
budget constraint in Equation (3.5) through choices about how many 
people to serve, which ones to serve, and how to allocate the inputs 
among those served. The equilibrium from this modifi ed optimization 
problem will differ in simple and intuitive ways from that obtained un-
der present value maximization in the preceding section. For example, 
if we consider maximizing the training center’s utility and if the train-
ing center gets disutility from a larger number of participants, then the 
resulting number of participants will not exceed that chosen under pres-
ent value maximization. If the training center gets utility from serving 
some particular group, say unemployed musicians, then it will serve 
more of them (or at least no fewer of them) under utility maximization 
than under present value maximization, and so on.
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In this setting, performance standards have no role to play, even if 
the training center has imperfect information about potential outcomes, 
so long as the utility functions of the politicians and the training center 
are similar enough (e.g., one is a linear transformation of the other) that 
they would reach the same solution to the ex ante utility maximization 
problem just described. A role for performance standards emerges when 
the two utility functions imply different choices. In that event, politi-
cians may want to provide additional incentives to training centers in a 
way that makes their choices closer to those implied by the politicians’ 
utility function. For example, if the training centers dislike having more 
participants at the margin and politicians like having more participants 
at the margin, then politicians will want to introduce performance stan-
dards in a way that rewards centers for having more participants. 
In one view, this situation, in which the politicians set up the local 
training centers, which then deliver services within the context of broad 
rules, represents a classic principal-agent problem. The politicians 
would like the training centers to choose an optimum that corresponds 
to their own utility, rather than that of the center staff. See the insight-
ful survey in Dixit (2002) and the references cited therein (as well as 
the other papers in the related special issue of the Journal of Human 
Resources) for further elaboration of this point. 
Politicians can bring center behavior in line with their own prefer-
ences in two basic ways.10 One obvious way consists of specifying the 
rules governing center behavior so narrowly as to leave center staff with 
little discretion to do otherwise than as specifi ed by program rules.11 
The fundamental problem with this approach in the context of ALMPs 
arises from the complexity of the task at hand and the large amount of 
(often tacit) local knowledge, in the sense of Hayek (1945), required for 
the task. Most training centers under JTPA and now under WIA serve 
individuals with quite heterogeneous desires and abilities by matching 
them with a (wide) variety of services provided either directly by the 
center or a service provider under contract. Attempting to prespecify the 
matches between participants and services would require either numb-
ing levels of regulatory detail or a false simplicity that would likely 
seriously degrade the quality of the resulting matches. Performance 
standards represent an alternative to micromanagement by the politi-
cians via program regulations. Here politicians defi ne the goals they 
seek by defi ning the performance measures and the “reward functions” 
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(described in Chapters 4 and 5 for the JTPA program) that link observed 
performance to rewards and punishments. In so doing, they allow cen-
ters to continue using their local knowledge in choosing whom to serve 
and how to serve them, while at the same time directing the application 
of this knowledge toward the politicians’ own goals.
An alternative view from a principal-agent perspective assumes 
that politicians and training centers share the same preferences about 
whom to serve and how to serve them, but differ in their desired level of 
training center effort. Put simply, politicians would like training center 
staff to work very hard, while training center staff would like to con-
sume some on-the-job leisure. This view links to the literature on piece 
rates, performance-based compensation for CEOs, and other types of 
incentives often found in private fi rms; this literature focuses almost 
exclusively on methods for tying remuneration to measured output as a 
means to increase unobserved effort (see Prendergast [1999] for an able 
survey, Lazear [1995] for a book-length treatment, and Chapter 5 for 
additional discussion in our context). We could incorporate this view 
into our model by breaking inputs e into two components, one repre-
senting staff effort and the other representing other inputs. The sum of 
staff effort would then enter negatively into the training center utility 
function, capturing the negative direct effect of staff effort; at the same 
time, staff effort would have an indirect positive effect on center utility 
through its effect on the present value of net impacts.
A third view of performance standards emphasizes the information 
they provide rather than their role in solving (or attempting to solve) 
one or the other of the principal-agent problems just described. In this 
view—discussed, for example, in Smith (2004)—performance standards 
represent quick and dirty impact evaluations. They provide valuable 
feedback to training center managers and staff (and to politicians) about 
their progress at meeting equity and effi ciency goals—feedback that, 
as Lechner and Smith (2007) note, training centers often otherwise 
never receive, because they rarely interact with those they serve after 
they serve them. Because the feedback comes quickly, it allows rapid 
responses to changes in performance due to changes in program opera-
tion, local economic conditions, or other factors. Our model does not 
capture this role for performance standards in a formal way; doing so 
would substantially complicate the model, as it would need to incorpo-
rate training center learning in response to the information provided by 
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the performance measures. We note in Chapter 9 some implications of 
thinking about performance measures in this way for the interpretation 
of the evidence on the correlation between performance measures and 
program impacts. Rather obviously, if performance measures exist to 
proxy long-run impacts, their correlation with those impacts becomes 
the paramount measure of their value.
All three views about the role of performance standards appear in 
the literature; in our view, all three have empirical relevance. In this 
chapter, we focus our model mainly on the fi rst of the three roles; gen-
eralizing our analysis to include the second is straightforward.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN PRACTICE
In practice, most performance measures M consist of participant 
outcomes in the short run. The focus on the short run stems from the de-
sire to provide prompt feedback to program managers and politicians. 
Feedback that arrives years after the corresponding actions by program 
staff does little to either motivate or inform. The focus on observed 
outcomes (i.e., did the participant get a job soon after fi nishing the pro-
gram?) rather than estimated impacts (i.e., did the participant do well in 
the labor market relative to what would have transpired had he or she 
not participated?) has several motivations. First, evaluations (experi-
mental or nonexperimental) that seek to estimate impacts by estimating 
the counterfactual outcomes of participants take a long time, typically 
on the order of years, to carry out. Even short-run impact estimates 
require considerable time to collect and prepare the necessary outcome 
data on participants (and, if required, a comparison group) for use in 
econometric analyses. Second, performance measures based on impacts 
often generate controversy, either because of uncertainty about the 
econometric method utilized, in the case of nonexperimental methods, 
or politically, in the case of random assignment. Finally, performance 
measures based on outcome levels generally cost much less to produce 
than measures based on impacts. As the literature on evaluating active 
labor market programs makes clear (see, e.g., Heckman, LaLonde, and 
Smith 1999), impact evaluation poses demanding technical problems 
that typically require the assistance of expensive experts and make the 
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process diffi cult to automate. In contrast, measuring outcomes presents 
much simpler problems and, once established, becomes a routine data 
collection and processing exercise. Costs matter, because an expensive 
performance management system, even if it accomplishes something, 
may not accomplish enough to justify the expense. 
The most common performance measure consists of employment 
rates in the period immediately following program participation. In 
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where the fi rst subscript on 11,iY  denotes age 1, the 0 subscript on 0S  
indicates the current cohort of trainees; 1(·) denotes the indicator func-
tion, which takes a value of 1 when its argument holds and a value of 
0 when it does not; and 1 11, 1,1( 0)i iE Y   is a dummy variable for em-
ployment (defi ned here as positive earnings) at age 1 (the fi rst period 
after participation). A slightly different formulation captures measures 
such as those in JTPA and WIA that consider wages or earnings condi-
tional on employment. For example, in our notation, a measure based 




1 1 1 1
0 1, 1, 1, 1,1 1
1, 1,
1 1( ) 1( 0)
1( 0) 1( 0)i i i ii S i Si i
i S i S




   
.
In this performance measure, the indicator function serves to con-
dition the average on the set of participants with positive wages or 
earnings.
As described in Chapters 2 and 4, not all performance measures 
focus on labor market outcomes. Some capture the receipt of various 
educational credentials, such as the GED, or, in the WIA program, cus-
tomer satisfaction measures based on surveys (where customers include 
both participants and the fi rms that might hire them). Smith, Whalley, 
and Wilcox (2010a,b) discuss and provide evidence on the value of such 
participant self-evaluation measures. For many years, the WIA perfor-
mance standards system also included a measure based on before-after 
earnings changes, which took advantage of the well-known preprogram 
dip in mean earnings among participants to produce the (highly mis-
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leading) appearance of large program impacts. Heckman and Smith 
(1999) document the dip using the National JTPA Study data and show 
its implications for, among others, the before-after estimator of program 
impacts. Incorporating any or all of these alternative performance mea-
sures into our model requires no conceptual innovations.
REWARD FUNCTIONS IN THE MODEL
The reward function R(M) links observed performance on the per-
formance measures to rewards and (much more rarely) punishments 
for training centers. In most performance systems for ALMPs around 
the world, rewards come informally, through praise and recognition. In 
contrast, Chapter 4 documents that rewards in the JTPA performance 
standards system took the form of budgetary increments determined by 
formal rules. The WIA system lies somewhere in between, with mon-
etary bonuses awarded to states that were probably more consequential 
for the recognition they accord than the funds they provide (see, for 
example, Heinrich [2007]).
The simplest system assigns a discrete reward R to centers meeting 
a defi ned standard in terms of observed performance. In terms of our 
notation, this implies the reward function
(3.9) 
 if ( ) ;
( ( ))






Here   denotes some fi xed level of attainment on the performance 
measure, such as 60 percent of former participants employed in the pe-
riod after training. Training centers that exceed that level get the reward 
and those that fall below it do not. As noted in Chapter 4, many more 
complicated reward functions exist (or have existed) in practice, in-
cluding functions that reward relative rather than absolute performance, 
functions that require certain levels of performance on multiple mea-
sures, and functions that reward marginal improvements in performance 
above  . Extending our model to incorporate such reward functions is 
straightforward.
For nonbudgetary rewards, it makes sense to put the re-
ward function directly in the training center utility function, as in 
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UT[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S),R(M)] where we leave the dependence of M on train-
ing center choices regarding whom to serve (S) and how to allocate the 
inputs e among those they serve implicit. Almost by defi nition, we as-
sume a positive partial derivative. 
In the case of budgetary rewards, things become a bit more com-
plicated. In that case, as in the JTPA and WIA programs, recognition 
remains part of the reward for good performance, and thus it makes 
sense to keep the reward function in the utility function. At the same 
time, receiving a budgetary reward changes the underlying choice prob-
lem in the next period by allowing the center to serve more individuals, 
to direct more inputs to those it would have served in any case, or both. 
Exactly how the additional budget affects choices depends in part on 
whether individuals served with the reward money count toward mea-
sured performance in the following period. If they do not, this allows 
centers to focus on satisfying their preferences regarding Q(S) with the 
reward money; for example, they might devote additional attention to 
the “hard to serve” among their eligible population. In the JTPA and 
WIA systems, individuals served with reward money do not, in fact, 
count toward measured performance; nonetheless, later in this chapter 
we assume for simplicity in our discussions of dynamics that they do, 
so that we can simply add the reward money R to the original budget B 
and proceed as before. 
THE EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON
CENTER BEHAVIOR: CREAM SKIMMING
This section outlines the implications of our model for center be-
havior in the presence of a performance standards system that uses the 
mean earnings (including the zeros) of participants at age “1” (i.e., in 
the period after program participation) as the performance measure and 
includes a reward function that increases in measured performance. To 
make things even simpler, in this section we suppose that training cen-
ter utility depends only on the present value of net impacts and the 
reward, corresponding to the utility function UT[ψ(S),R(M)].
Adding the basic performance management system just described 
to the model changes all of the fi rst order conditions. In each case, when 
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choosing how many to serve, whom to serve, and how to allocate inputs, 
the training center now considers the effect of the choice on both ( )S  
and ( )R M . Thus, when it evaluates a potential participant, instead of 
just considering their expected discounted stream of net impacts, the 
center also considers their expected earnings in the period immediately 
following participation. A potential participant who wants to enroll in, 
say, a two-year vocational training program after getting a GED with 
the help of the program becomes less attractive in the presence of the 
performance standards system laid out in the preceding paragraph. On 
the other hand, a potential participant who will fi nd a job with high 
earnings one or two weeks earlier with the program’s help but otherwise 
derives no benefi t from it becomes more attractive. This new emphasis 
on short-term outcomes in choosing whom to serve and how to allocate 
inputs leads to the common criticism that performance standards sys-
tems generate cream skimming (see, e.g., Barnow and Smith [2004]; 
Radin [2006]; Trutko et al. [2005]; GAO [2002]). 
Before turning to a discussion of the effects of cream skimming on 
the effi ciency and equity of training center operation, we now formally 
defi ne cream skimming. The policy literature often defi nes cream skim-
ming rather casually to mean serving the least “hard to serve” among 
the eligible population. In terms of our model’s notation, the simple per-
formance system described above creates an incentive to serve persons 
with high values of 11,iY , regardless of whether that high value results 
from a high value of 01,iY  or a high value of  1,i . 
The existing literature is vague about whether cream skimming 
should be defi ned in terms of 0,1
1
,1 or  ii YY . Our model, and the logic of per-
formance measurement systems more generally, suggests a defi nition in 
terms of 1,1 iY , as it is 
1
1,iY  that the performance standards incentivize train-
ing centers to take account of in their decisions.12 Of course, given the 
evidence in Bell and Orr (2002) that caseworkers do reasonably well at 
forecasting 10,iY and reasonably poorly at forecasting 1,i , as well as the 
evidence in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) that, at least for the 
JTPA program, most of the variance in 11,iY  corresponds to variance in
0
1,iY  
(or, put differently, the variance of 1,i  is small relative to that of 
0
1,iY ), 
the distinction may not matter much empirically.13
We now consider the implications of cream skimming for pro-
gram equity and effi ciency in the context of our model. To keep the 
discussion simple, for the purposes of this section we make the simpli-
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fying assumption that untreated outcomes do not vary with age, so that 
0, 0,
a
i iY Y  for all “a.” This assumption allows us to summarize equity 
concerns in a single number, where we defi ne equity as serving those 
with the lowest values of 0,iY  among the eligible.
Consider fi rst an important special case. As noted in Heckman 
(1992); Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); and Djebbari and 
Smith (2008), conventional models of program evaluation assume that 
1 0
, , and a i a iY Y  differ by a constant, so that 
1 0
, , ,  for all a i a i a i aY Y i     . 
Put differently, they assume that everyone has the same impact of 
treatment—the so-called common effect model.14 In the common ef-
fect world, a high 1,1 iY  goes hand in glove with a high 
0
,1 iY , and picking 
persons with a high 0,1 iY  helps toward satisfying Equation (3.8). In the 
context of our model, the common effect assumption simplifi es the pro-
duction function in Equation (3.2) to 
(3.2') 1 0 0( , )a a a aY f Y e Y    ,
which removes the input choice decision from the problem (and with it 
the variable cost portion of the cost function). 
Assuming equal fi xed costs for all trainees, training centers in a 
common effect world serve only the individuals at the top of the dis-
tribution of untreated outcomes among the eligible. In this world, the 
discounted stream of impacts does not depend on who gets served, leav-
ing the center free to maximize their measured performance. Thus, in 
the common effect world, our simple performance standards system has 
no effect on economic effi ciency but very unattractive equity effects.
A mild generalization of the common effect world illustrates an-
other important point. Suppose that all individuals share the same 

















but that the timing of the impacts varies. To keep things very simple, 
suppose that one random half of the eligibles have impacts of zero in 
periods 0 and 1, the period of participation and the period just after, 
while the other random half has impacts of zero in period 0 but positive 
impacts in period 1 and all future periods, with the impacts just a bit 
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smaller than those in the fi rst group so that the discounted sum comes 
out the same. Training centers will now prefer, at the margin and to 
the extent that they can identify them, the individuals with the earlier 
impacts. Put differently, given the same value of 01,iY , an individual with 
a positive impact the period following participation adds more to a cen-
ter’s measured performance than an individual with no positive impacts 
until the second period after participation. Thus, performance measures 
based on outcomes in period 1 encourage the provision of services that 
yield quick improvements in outcomes relative to later improvements 
in outcomes, even conditional on the same discounted sum. At the mar-
gin, the center would even trade off some of the discounted impacts to 
get a larger impact in the period of performance measurement, an incen-
tive that those who complain about an overemphasis on low-intensity 
“work fi rst” strategies clearly have in mind. 
Another simple model inspired by Heckman, Smith, and Clements 
(1997) assumes independence between impacts and untreated outcomes, 
while continuing to assume no variable inputs and constant fi xed costs. 
The production function becomes
(3.2') 1 0 0, , , ,( , )a i a i a i a iY f Y e Y    ,
with ,a i  independent of 
0
,a iY  for 1,...,a A . In this world, in the ab-
sence of performance standards the training centers rank individuals 
by their discounted impacts and start serving individuals from the top, 
continuing down the distribution until the budget runs out from paying 
fi xed costs. In contrast, adding in our simple performance standards 
system makes the problem two-dimensional, with centers now serv-
ing those individuals with good present values of impacts and good 
outcomes in the period following participation, whether due to a large 
impact or to a good untreated outcome (or both) in that period. As in 
the common effect model, the introduction of performance standards 
leads centers to move toward serving individuals who, on average, have 
better outcomes in the untreated state. Thus, once again, it has prob-
lematic equity effects. In this model, the performance standards clearly 
reduce effi ciency, as centers will now, at the margin, implicitly trade 
off discounted impacts for good untreated outcomes in the period of 
performance measurement. 
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Finally, consider the same simple world as in the previous example, 
with production function (3.2') and so on, but assume that impacts and 
untreated outcomes have rank correlation γ. We have already consid-
ered the case of independence, which implies a rank correlation of zero. 
With a positive rank correlation equal to one, training center behavior 
does not change at all with the introduction of performance standards 
because, given our simplifying assumptions, the same individuals have 
both the largest impacts and the largest outcomes in the period follow-
ing participation. More generally, with a positive rank correlation of 
less than one, we expect relatively small reductions in both the equity 
and effi ciency associated with training center choices. This is because 
some individuals with good discounted impacts but bad outcomes in 
period 1 get dropped in favor of individuals with good untreated out-
comes in period 1 but smaller discounted impacts; at the same time, 
most individuals either participate or not both with and without the per-
formance standards. In contrast, with a negative rank correlation, the 
introduction of performance standards should lead to greater losses on 
both dimensions, as there is more scope for training centers to trade off 
impacts and outcomes. A negative correlation implies more individuals 
below the cutoff (in terms of discounted impacts in a world without 
performance standards) with high values of the untreated outcome, who 
can therefore add substantially to measured performance in the world 
with the performance standards.
If we now undo some of our simplifying assumptions by restoring 
variation in untreated outcomes over time and in marginal inputs costs, 
the model becomes much more complicated but the same intuition ap-
plies. In general, if we start from a situation where training centers care 
only about discounted net impacts, adding performance standards to 
the model reduces effi ciency. The common effect case constitutes an 
interesting but empirically irrelevant exception. The effects on equity 
depend on the correlation between impacts and untreated outcomes 
in the period of performance measurement. With no correlation or a 
positive correlation, performance standards lead to cream skimming, 
implying negative equity effects. 
The fi nal relaxation of our assumptions occurs when we return 
to assuming that the training center utility function includes not just 
discounted impacts and performance rewards but also trainee character-
istics and the number of trainees. With this utility function as the starting 
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point, it becomes possible to describe cases in which performance stan-
dards increase effi ciency. For example, if frontline workers have the 
“social worker mentality” described in Heckman, Smith, and Taber 
(1996) and prefer to serve those with the lowest untreated outcomes, 
and if impacts have a positive correlation with untreated outcomes as 
suggested in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), then performance 
standards based on short-term outcomes may increase effi ciency com-
pared to the status quo, even though they reduce effi ciency relative to 
the case of net impact maximization. 
In the end, the effect of introducing performance standards on effi -
ciency becomes an empirical question, as it depends on the relationship 
between impacts and untreated outcomes, on the relationship between 
short-run and long-run impacts, and on the extent to which training cen-
ters pursue objectives other than maximizing discounted impacts in a 
world without performance standards. Chapter 6 considers how to mea-
sure cream skimming and discusses the available empirical evidence. 
Chapter 9, as well as Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), consid-
ers the relationship between outcomes and impacts. Hotz, Imbens, and 
Klerman (2006); Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004); and Dyke et al. 
(2006) (among others) consider the relationship between short-run and 
long-run impacts.
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
Until now, we have not considered strategic responses of the sort 
documented in Chapters 7 and 8 in our model. This section considers 
“static” strategic responses related to measurement; we consider dy-
namic responses related to the manipulation of termination dates later 
on in the chapter after introducing the dynamic version of our model. 
The static responses we have in mind include the strategic enrollment 
decisions in the JTPA program documented in Doolittle and Traeger 
(1990) and the apparent manipulation of the telephone surveys origi-
nally used to measure employment shortly after termination in the JTPA 
program, which the USDOL sought to end with stricter procedural di-
rectives.15 In regard to the former, only individuals formally enrolled in 
JTPA (or, in WIA, those receiving more than core services), count for 
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the performance measures. The evidence makes it clear that, in the early 
years of JTPA prior to the tightening of the rules on enrollment, training 
centers sometimes provided services to individuals but did not formally 
enroll them until their prospects for contributing positively to the cen-
ter’s measured performance looked good. In regard to the latter, until 
response rate requirements appeared (and then, later, administrative 
data replaced telephone surveys for this outcome), centers appeared to 
selectively survey their recent terminees with the goal of maximizing 
their measured performance.
A simple extension of the model to incorporate this strategic be-
havior begins by making a distinction between actual performance and 
measured performance. Actual performance, denoted by M (S), consists 
of what the performance measure would equal if measured by a neutral 
outsider objectively applying program rules, while measured perfor-
mance, denoted by M *(S), consists of performance as measured and 
reported by the training center. Now assume that centers can incur some 
cost to improve their measured performance. Formally, let 
M*(S) = g[M(S),cs],
where sc  denotes the cost of manipulating the measured performance 
numbers in terms of both staff time and effort and the present value of 
any political fallout from doing so. Further assume positive fi rst de-
rivatives, as well as a negative second derivative with respect to sc , so 
that additional costs increase measured performance but at a decreasing 
rate. This production function will likely differ among training centers 
depending on the types of services they provide and the honesty of their 
staff (which affects their psychic costs of strategic behavior and thus the 
compensation they must receive for engaging in it). For example, under 
JTPA, centers that specialized in job search assistance and subsidized 
on-the-job training at private fi rms, both of which provide clear signals 
of likely success at obtaining employment, may have had an easier time 
manipulating enrollment decisions than centers that provided more 
classroom training, where employment outcomes typically do not get 
realized until course completion but where payments to providers may 
have necessitated enrollment.
Incorporating these costs into the model by replacing actual perfor-
mance in the reward function with measured performance as determined 
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by this production function adds an additional fi rst order condition to 
the solution of the training center optimization problem. Training cen-
ters now select sc  to balance the marginal benefi ts and marginal costs 
of altering their measured performance relative to their actual perfor-
mance. Because their actual performance enters the production function 
for measured performance and the cross-partial of the production func-
tion need not equal zero, and because centers will choose to spend real 
resources on manipulating their measured performance, the possibility 
of strategic misrepresentation also alters centers’ actual performance. 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND BUDGETARY 
DYNAMICS IN A TWO-PERIOD MODEL
We now consider the dynamics that arise in our model when train-
ing centers receive budgetary rewards for performance (as with the 
bonus awards under WIA). In particular, assume that reward R aug-
ments the center budget for the next cohort of trainees but cannot be 
used as direct bonuses to center administrators or line workers. The 
possibility of receiving a budgetary reward directs attention toward the 
short-run goal of maximizing performance on M (S0), and may or may 
not serve to maximize the present value of net impacts ( , , )S B J  for 
the current cohort of participants. We begin with an analysis of a model 
for a training center that serves only two cohorts of trainees, with the 
fi rst served in period 0 and the second served in period 1. This simple 
model provides a useful point of departure for the more complicated 
model we analyze in the next section.
In this context, the incentives provided by performance standards 
create a new intertemporal dynamic. Decisions by the center today af-
fect the quality and quantity of participants in the fi rst period as well 
as the resources available to the center to serve the second period co-
hort. In addition to this intertemporal connection, the center’s decision 
problem changes in character because center performance M (S0) is a 
random variable as of date 0. Thus, when making decisions in period 1, 
the center faces a fi xed budget B for period 1 but a stochastic budget for 
period 2, call it B , with the budgetary uncertainty resolved only after 
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the center chooses 0S  and e in the fi rst period and the resulting labor 
market outcomes for the fi rst period participants are revealed. 
Assuming a simple reward function that pays out B for performance 
above a threshold earnings target, we can write 
0
0
 if ( ) ;
 if ( ) .
B M S
B




   

In this simplifi ed two-cohort model, the center picks 0S  to maximize
(3.10)
where 1/(1 )  is a discount rate, 11S denotes the participants selected 
in the second period if 0( )M S  , and 
0
1S  denotes the participants 
selected in the second period if 0( )M S  . 
Centers can solve this maximization problem in two stages. For the 
second period cohort, there are two possible states, corresponding to 
whether the fi rst cohort succeeds or fails relative to the performance 
standards. In the fi rst stage, the center solves the second period optimi-
zation problem for both possible budgets. Given these optimal values, 
in the second stage it picks S0 and 0e  to maximize the criterion Equation 
(3.10) given the values for the second period selected in the fi rst stage. 
Heuristically, if 0S were a continuous variable, and Equation (3.10) 
were differentiable in 0S , the fi rst order condition for 0S  would be
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The fi rst term refl ects the value of S0 in raising the current util-
ity of the training center. The second term captures the dynamic effect 
of budgetary rewards, which link current period performance to future 
period utility. This effect equals the marginal effect of S0 on the prob-
ability of winning the award times the increase in center utility from 
winning.16 Of course, the actual solution is more complicated because 
the criterion is not differentiable in S0. A similar condition holds for the 
choice of inputs 0e in the fi rst period. As the two-cohort model includes, 
by defi nition, no third cohort, the center’s second period choices have 
no intertemporal aspect.
In this two-cohort model, performance standards may distort center 
choices in two ways. The fi rst consists of the static distortions already 
discussed. The second results from the intertemporal linkage induced by 
the budgetary rewards. For certain values of the parameters, the center 
may choose to trade off fi rst period utility for second period utility by 
distorting its fi rst period choices so as to obtain the performance reward 
and thereby a larger budget in the second period. This scenario becomes 
more likely as the reward increases and 0   decreases, because both 
of these increase the value in the fi rst period of having a larger budget to 
spend in the second period. The substantive importance of this scenario 
also depends on having a suffi ciently small positive (or even negative) 
correlation between the performance measure and discounted impacts. 
As discussed above, if discounted impacts have a large positive correla-
tion with the performance measure, the center does not face much of a 
trade-off between the two.
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND BUDGETARY 
DYNAMICS IN A STATIONARY ENVIRONMENT
This simple two-cohort model abstracts from the fact that training 
centers serve multiple cohorts over many time periods. In this section, 
we examine our model under the extreme (but analytically simple) 
assumption that training centers operate forever in a stationary environ-
ment; that is, other than the potentially time-varying budget induced 
by the performance system, the key aspects of the center’s decision 
problem, such as the distribution of eligibles, the budget constraint in 
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Equation (3.5), and the production function for treated outcomes in 
Equation (3.2), all remain the same. 
In each period, training centers can be in one of two states: 1) in 
receipt of a bonus R, so that they have budget B+R to spend in the 
current period, or 2) without the bonus, so that they have budget B. 
The budget in each period depends on the center’s choices regarding 
S and e in the preceding period. As the model assumes a stationary 
environment and only two states of the world, the centers face what the 
technical literature calls a Markovian decision problem. In this type of 
decision problem, the center’s optimal decision depends only on which 
of the two budget states it occupies in the current period; as a result, the 
choices S and e require subscripts for the state of the world but not for 
the time period.
Let V0 denote the center’s value function with budget B in the cur-
rent period, and let V1 denote the value function for a center budget B + 
R in the current period. Then,
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 
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It follows from the usual assumptions about the utility function that 
1 0V V ; in other words, centers prefer to have more resources available. 
The optimal choice of S depends on the rewards, the preferences, and 
the constraints facing centers. 
We now present some intuitive analysis of some of the effects of the 
incentives induced by the performance standards in our simple dynamic 
model. First, let P01 indicate the probability of not receiving a reward in 
one period and receiving one in the next period and let P11 indicate the 
probability of receiving a reward in two consecutive periods. As having 
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more resources makes it easier to attain all center objectives, including 
meeting the performance standards, it follows that 11 01P P . Perfor-
mance standards with budgetary rewards impart a value to incumbency.
Second, the analysis of the two-period model carries over in part in 
this more general setting. With suffi ciently large R, suffi ciently small 
ρ, and suffi ciently misdirected performance incentives (incentives not 
aligned with maximizing the present value of net impacts), centers may 
sacrifi ce utility in the current period in order to obtain the budgetary 
reward and thereby increase their utility in the next period. 
Third, consider the special case of centers that, in the absence of the 
performance standards, care only about maximizing the present value 
of net impacts (and thus not about N(S) or Q(S)). For certain values of 
the parameters, such centers may divert resources away from that goal 
in low budget (nonreward) periods. They will do so in order to get the 
budgetary reward in the following period, which can then be spent on 
generating a larger total discounted stream of net impacts than would 
period-by-period net impact maximization.
Fourth, continuing with the same special case, with a suffi ciently 
low probability of attaining the reward threshold and a suffi ciently 
high reward R, the introduction of performance standards can lower the 
aggregate net impacts produced by all centers. Unsuccessful centers di-
vert their activities away from productive uses and toward meeting the 
performance targets but reap no budgetary rewards. Successful centers 
produce more net impacts in the next period because they have more re-
sources, but these additional impacts may not suffi ce to make up for the 
reductions in impacts in the current period from the centers that failed 
to reach the performance targets despite diverting resources away from 
present value maximization. If the increases in the present value of net 
impacts from the successful centers do not exceed the decreases from 
the unsuccessful centers, then aggregate output falls.
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND BUDGETARY 
DYNAMICS: THE REAL WORLD
As described in Chapters 2 and 4 and in more detail for WIA in 
Heinrich (2007), both JTPA and WIA built budgetary rewards into 
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their performance systems. However, in both programs, the budget-
ary awards did not simply get added to the budget for the following 
period, as we have assumed for simplicity in our model. Instead, in 
JTPA, individuals served using the budgetary reward money did not 
count against the performance measures in the following period. This 
allowed centers to focus these funds on, in most cases, the hard to serve. 
In the context of our model, they spent them to maximize their util-
ity in terms of ( , , )S B J , ( )Q S , and ( )N S without worrying about 
R[M(S)]. Similarly, under WIA, most states spend their bonus funds 
on program improvements, either in the form of new initiatives or en-
hancements to current program infrastructure and services (e.g., trying 
to develop learning programs that engage dropouts, at-risk youth, and 
disadvantaged adults, improving outreach activities, and so on). Tak-
ing into account the realities of the programs does not change the basic 
dynamics outlined in the preceding two sections. For certain parameter 
values, centers might still fi nd it optimal to take a hit in terms of current 
period utility in order to obtain the reward money, provided the addi-
tional utility obtained in the next period more than makes up for the loss 
when discounted back to the current period. 
Moreover, with economies of scale in center operations, the real 
world budgetary rewards in JTPA and WIA may still generate the sort 
of incumbency effects described in the preceding section. Centers in 
JTPA and WIA could spend their reward money in part on adminis-
trative costs. If, for example, they would buy productivity-increasing 
offi ce equipment or hire better managers with this money, this should 
spill over to the participants served under the regular budget B. In the 
model, we could capture this by making c(e) declining in N(S) to re-
fl ect economies of scale that arise from using physical or human capital 
more intensively.
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT
Another dynamic incentive induced by performance standards 
arises when centers have some fl exibility over the period in which their 
participants count for the purposes of the performance measures. As 
documented for JTPA in Chapter 7, centers have some fl exibility in the 
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timing of termination decisions for their participants. Thus, around the 
end of one period (a program year in JTPA or WIA) they have some 
choice regarding whether to count particular participants in the current 
period or in the next period. When centers face nonlinear reward func-
tions, like the simple one considered above in which the center receives 
R for attaining some threshold level of performance τ but has no incen-
tive to do better at the margin either above or below τ, centers above the 
cutoff in the current period will want to move “good” participants to the 
following period. In contrast, a center with performance well below τ in 
the current period will want to move “bad” participants who might oth-
erwise fi nish participating in the next period back to the current period, 
where they can do no harm to a “lost cause.”
Our formal model does not capture this particular strategic response 
to performance standards, though we could modify it to do so. The sim-
plest change would add the capacity for centers to count some current 
period participant realizations against performance in the following pe-
riod. Doing so would have some per-participant cost that increased with 
the number of current period participants counted in the next period. 
The increasing per-participant cost captures the effect of rules, such as 
those in JTPA and WIA, that govern how long centers can keep partici-
pants “on the books” without spending money on them, as well as the 
fact that some program services (such as occupational training courses) 
have fi xed durations, thus limiting fl exibility. A set of more complicated 
changes to the model would also allow centers to bring forward good 
outcomes from the following period. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has laid out a (relatively) simple model of training cen-
ter behavior in the context of a generic performance standards system 
similar to those used in active labor market programs around the world. 
Such performance standards systems have a variety of justifi cations, 
including aligning center behavior with the preferences of politicians 
who fund but do not operate them, solving a principal-agent problem 
by increasing the effort levels of center staff, and providing “quick and 
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dirty” pseudo-evaluations of the extent to which the program improves 
the labor market outcomes of participants. 
This model clarifi es the ways in which performance standards 
systems affect center behavior, and the conditions under which those 
changes will increase the earnings or employment gains from partic-
ipation, as well as the conditions under which they have positive or 
negative equity effects by changing the set of persons served among the 
eligible. We clarify the discussion of cream skimming in the literature 
in the context of our model. We show that the effects of introducing 
a performance standards system depend in part on center preferences 
and in part on empirical parameters such as the correlation between 
the short-term participant outcomes typically utilized as performance 
measures and the long-term behavioral impacts that represent the real 
goal of most programs. 
We extend our simple model to include strategic behavior by train-
ing centers seeking to “game” the performance measures, whether by 
playing tricks with measurement in a static context or by manipulating 
the period in which participants count against the performance mea-
sures in a dynamic context. We examine two dynamic versions of our 
model in which centers receive budgetary rewards in each period based 
on their measured performance in the prior period. In this dynamic con-
text, further distortions of center choices can result, as they may have 
an incentive to trade off utility (and perhaps discounted net impacts) in 
one period to achieve high performance and thus a larger budget in the 
following period.
Overall, this model provides a framework for thinking about the 
effects of performance standards on organizational behavior in the con-
text of ALMPs and in broader contexts such as schools. In so doing, it 
motivates and provides a theoretical context for the empirical investiga-
tions presented in the later chapters of this book. Finally, in our view, 
the analysis in this chapter, along with the empirical evidence presented 
elsewhere in the book, suggests that policymakers who have mandated 
such systems, as well as the administrators who have determined their 
details and undertaken their practical implementation, have often failed 
to appreciate the diffi culty of designing a performance system that 
makes things better (rather than making them worse), as well as the 
dependence of the effects of performance standards systems on empiri-
cal parameters that remain generally unknown and little investigated. 
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Notes
1. See Hanushek (2002) for a discussion of accountability systems in edu-
cation based on performance standards at the teacher and school level. 
See, for example, Barnow (1992) and Barnow and Smith (2004) for addi-
tional discussions of performance standards in publicly provided training 
programs.
2. Wilson (1989) and Dixit (2002) discuss confl icts regarding the objectives 
of programs as outcomes of a political process.
3. On the issue of the timing of participation, see, for example, Sianesi 
(2004), Heckman and Navarro (2007), and Fredrikkson and Johansson 
(2008) and the papers cited therein.
4. It can also be negative in the long run, as indeed it was for male youth 
in JTPA. Bloom et al. (1993), Bloom et al. (1997), and Orr et al. (1996) 
provide more detail regarding the experimental impact estimates from the 
National JTPA Study. 
5. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) present evidence on the importance 
of general equilibrium effects in evaluating large scale educational pro-
grams and Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) provide evidence of such effects 
in an earnings supplement program. 
6. Note that r may represent a social discount factor.
7. We assume interior solutions. Suffi cient conditions for an interior solu-
tion are concavity of Equation (3.2) in e for all 0,a iY , convexity of ci(ei) for 
each i, and Inada conditions on both cost and technology. For some S, the 
constraint in Equation (3.4) may be slack (that is, λ = 1 can be obtained).
8. There may be more than one S that qualifi es. If so, we assume the training 
center picks one of them at random.
9. There is an additional stage to the allocation process that we do not con-
sider, namely, the allocation of the overall program budget among centers. 
From the standpoint of economic effi ciency, the budget should be allo-
cated to equate returns at the margin for all centers.
10. We ignore other methods for aligning training center behavior with poli-
ticians’ preferences, such as developing a professional culture among 
caseworkers. See, for example, Wilson (1989) for further discussion.
11. See the related discussion in Sosin (1986) regarding the interaction be-
tween rules and caseworker discretion in the old Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
12. In thinking about cream skimming from a policy perspective, two other 
facts should be kept in mind. First, as shown in Chapter 6, even if cream 
skimming occurs, the operation of program eligibility rules means that 
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even the cream consists of relatively disadvantaged individuals. Thus, at 
least in programs like JTPA or WIA, cream skimming does not generally 
mean that program resources were spent on, for example, middle-class 
people. Second, in the United States, many federal, state, local, and vol-
untary sector employment and training programs coexist at any given 
point in time. For example, National Commission for Employment Policy 
(1995) documents that dozens of other programs coexisted with JTPA. 
When thinking about cream skimming in a particular program, such as 
WIA, it should be kept in mind that other programs may provide services 
better suited to the hardest to serve among that program’s eligible popula-
tion. Determining whether cream skimming, should it occur, is good or 
bad, requires more thought than the literature typically devotes to it. 
13. The fi nding in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) will hold in general 
for programs with small mean impacts relative to the mean untreated out-
come, so long as the impacts are not strongly negatively correlated with 
the untreated outcome. 
14. In models with regressors, this assumption is Δa,i (X) = Ya,i − Ya,i = Δa for 
all i, yielding equal impacts for all persons with the same X.
15. See JTPA Directive No. D98-15, February 22, 1999.
16. In this heuristic problem, we assume that the second order conditions are 
satisfi ed.
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